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Glass: Agrarian v. Chamber of Commerce: A Recurring Conflict in Florida

NOTES
AGRARIAN V. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE:
A RECURRING CONFLICT IN FLORIDA*
In 1919 Grower moved to Sunshine City in Grapefruit County,
Florida. At that time Sunshine City had a population of 450 within
its corporate limits of two square miles. Grower selected Sunshine
City because its location and climate were ideally suited for the
cultivation of citrus, and he purchased a 200-acre tract of land for
that purpose. The tract was located some four miles from the center
of Sunshine City; thus it was close enough to town so that the community's available labor force and the truck line for hauling the
fruit to market could be economically utilized, but still the acreage
was in a rural area outside the city limits and far enough from the
community so as not to interfere with its growth and development.
Grower cleared the land, planted seedlings, and nursed them through
drought, freeze, and hurricane until he had 200 acres of productive
orange grove. Today he is a successful citrus producer.
Grower's prosperity has been paralleled by that of Sunshine City.
The community has flourished. Because of its ideal location new
industries have settled nearby and the city has become a winter tourist
resort; the population has correspondingly surged to over 15,000
within a five-mile radius of the center of the city. Instead of his
tract being located in a rural area, Grower's grove is now surrounded
by housing developments on three sides and a new state highway with
attendant filling stations, restaurants, and curio shops on the fourth.
The Sunshine City Chamber of Commerce wants the city to continue
its booming growth; accordingly it proposes the annexation of the
area in which Grower's property is located. Annexation will increase the city's corporate limits and population; it will provide the
inhabitants of the area with municipal benefits. In addition it will
cause municipal taxes to be levied on Grower's property; this will, in
turn, increase his overhead costs and perhaps force him to abandon
the grove property as income producing and sell it to a subdivision
entrepreneur, who will promote a new housing development. The
Chamber is happy -the city will be progressing. But what about
*The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Edward M.
Brigham, LL.B. University of Florida, 1959, in the preparation of this note.

[297]

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

1

Florida Law Review,
Vol. 12, Iss.
3 [1959],
Art. 4
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW
REVIEW
Grower? What can he do to protect his investment? Can he prevent
the city from taxing him out of the grove business?
Section 8 of Article VIII of the Florida Constitution grants the
legislature the power "to establish, and to abolish, municipalities to
provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and
powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time." Municipal
corporations can thus be created by special act of the legislature or
under the general law providing for the establishment of municipalities that was enacted under this constitutional grant of power.,
Inherent in the power to establish and abolish municipalities is the
power to annex territory to an existing municipality; 2 correspondingly annexation can be accomplished through one of two methods:
3
(1) by special act of the legislature or (2) under the general law.
The procedure followed in establishing a municipality is important.
If it was originally created or enlarged by special act, territory can be
annexed to it only by special act; 4 thus the authority under which the

municipality was created determines the method of annexation that
can be effectively utilized. 5
Whether Sunshine City must annex the territory in which Grower's
property is located under the general law or by special act of the
legislature is of limited concern to Grower, for seemingly there is
little he can do to prevent annexation aside from attacking it procedurally. 6 If the annexation is under general law, there is a possi1FLA. STAT. ch. 165 (1957). For the establishment of municipalities generally
see Dauer and Miller, Municipal Charters in Florida: Law and Drafting, 6 U. FLA.
L. REv. 413, 416-22 (1953). See also Comment, 4 U. MIANI L.Q. 78 (1949).
2See MacGuyer v. City of Tampa, 89 Fla. 138, 103 So. 418 (1925).
3For the annexation of territory to an existing municipality generally see Dauer
and Miller, supra note I, at 449-55. See also Comment, 4 MIAMI L.Q. 78 (1949).
4State ex rel. Davis v. City of Homestead, 100 Fla. 354, 130 So. 28, afl'd on
rehearing, 100 Fla. 361, 130 So. 32 (1930).
sUnder the special act creating the municipality the legislature can also
authorize the municipality to extend its boundaries, either by providing a method
of annexation applicable to the particular municipality or by expressly empowering
the municipality to annex under the general law; thus the mere fact that a municipality has been created by special act does not necessarily preclude the annexation of territory under general law. See City of Sebring v. Harder Hall, Inc.,
150 Fla. 824, 9 So.2d 350 (1942). For a judicial discussion of annexation generally
see City of Oconee v. Bowness, 65 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1953).
6The word seemingly is used because the subsequent discussion is based on
the statutes applicable to annexation under general law and on the niceties of
enactment of special acts by the legislature. There is a possibility that a property
owner may be able to prevent annexation of his property by injunction. See
Gillete v. City of Tampa, 57 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1952), in which a landowner was per-
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bility that he may be able to prevent it. Chapter 171 of Florida
Statutes 1957 provides three procedures, based on a population determination, for the annexation of unincorporated tracts into an
existing municipality:
(1) If the tract to be incorporatedhas less than ten registered
voters, annexation may be effected by ordinance passed by
the city council.7
(2) If the unincorporated tract has ten or more registered
voters, the ordinance must be submitted to a separate
vote of the voters of the municipality and of the tract;
if approved by a two-thirds majority of those voting in
both groups separately, annexation is effected. 8
(3) If the municipality has 10,000 inhabitants,annexation can
be accomplished by submitting the ordinance to a combined vote of the voters within the municipality and the
territory to be annexed; if approved by a two-thirds
majority of those voting, annexation is effected. 9
If the annexation by Sunshine City is under either of the first
two procedures, Grower may be able to prevent the annexation of
his property.1 0 Section 171.04 expressly authorizes both procedures
and also provides that when there are less than ten registered voters
two property owners within the unincorporated tract may petition
the circuit court, setting forth their objections to annexation. If the
petition is successful, annexation will be prevented., There is no
such provision expressly related to the situation in which there are
ten or more registered voters within the unincorporated tract, but
there is a final limiting provision that a single owner of property
in the tract may petition to prevent annexation if the unincorporated
mitted to bring a bill to enjoin the City of Tampa from annexing his property
under a procedure provided by special act of the legislature. See also Farrington
v. Flood, 40 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1949).
?FLA. STAT. §171.04 (1957).
8lbid.
9FLA. STAT. §171.05 (1957). This procedure is also applicable to the annexation
of incorporated tracts by an existing municipality as well as unincorporated tracts.
loThe word may merely indicates the writer's dismay at the wording of FLA.
STAT. §171.04 (1957).
"Aside from a procedural attack on the proposed annexation, there are two
other grounds, to be discussed infra, on which to base an objection to annexation.
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tract is "vacant and uninhabited, or if such tract is owned solely by
one individual person." This final provision is linked in the statute
with the procedure relating to the annexation of a tract with ten
or more registered voters; hence it may be applicable only to that
procedure or it may be applicable to both.
The third procedure, for municipalities with more than 10,000
inhabitants, is authorized under a different statute, and there is no
statutory authority for objection prior to annexation.12
Regardless of which of the foregoing procedures is utilized by
Sunshine City, there is little possibility that Grower can prevent annexation of his property under the general law. If the first procedure
is used, the council ordinance is determinative unless Grower can
get another landowner to join him in the petition or unless the final
limiting provision relating to objection by a single owner is applicable
and he can qualify thereunder. If the second procedure is used,
Grower can easily be outvoted and his property annexed unless he
can qualify under the final limiting provision. If the third procedure
is used, he is completely at the mercy of the voters and can do little
to prevent the annexation of his property.
If the tract in which Grower's property is located can be annexed
only by special act of the legislature, he is virtually helpless to prevent the annexation. Aside from the fact that the bill to annex would
be passed without objection, since it would be a "local bill" and thus
passed unaminously on recommendation of the local representative,
the legislature can annex property to a municipality without submitting it to a referendum of the persons affected thereby. 13
Although Grower may not be able to prevent the actual annexation of his property by Sunshine City, he is not necessarily without
relief, for he may be able to contest successfully the inclusion of his
property within the corporate limits. The power of the legislature to
establish or extend municipal boundaries is unquestioned, but it is
not unlimited. 14 Whether municipal boundaries are established or
12FLA. STAT. §171.05 (1957).
-:'FLA.

Comr. art. III, §21. provides that special acts "establishing or abolishing

municipalities, or providing for their government, jurisdiction and powers, or
altering or amending the same" can be enacted without subjecting them to a
referendum if notice is given of an intention to apply for such an act. This
provision was adopted in 1938. For cases on point prior to 1938 see State ex Tel.
Davis v. City of Clearwater, 106 Fla. 761, 139 So. 377 (1931), reafJ'd, 108 Fla. 635,
146 So. 836 (1933); State v. City of Miami, 103 Fla. 54, 137 So. 261 (1931).
'4State ex rel. Davis v. City of Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335 (1929).
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extended by special act or under the general law there are two major
limitations on establishment or extension. In order for territory to
be incorporated into a municipality the territory must be (1) contiguous and (2) susceptible to municipal benefits. 15 The limitation
of contiguity has given rise to very few reported cases, although the
rule is well established that in order for territory to be lawfully annexed into an existing municipality it must be contiguous thereto.",
The reverse is true as to the limitation of susceptibility to municipal
benefits; there has been a maze of reported cases based on this limitation. It is the purpose of this note to analyze this second limitation commonly referred to as the "benefits test" - in light of its historical
development and its present-day application.

THE BENEFITS TST
The benefits test was born during the "bust" following the Great
Florida Land Boom of the 1920's. During the boom, land speculation
was rife. Subdivision entrepreneurs moved into the state, laid paper
plans before the eyes of municipal fathers, and told them of the
pie in the sky that could be theirs for the taking. City councils became infatuated with the possibility of developing great, thriving
municipalities and towed the legislature in their wake. During the
1925 legislative session special act after special act was passed creating
cities out of swamps and extending the boundaries of sleepy villages
over fantastically large areas of scrub land." When the bubble burst
15Aside from a procedural attack on a proposed annexation, these two limitations provide the basis for objection, if there can be an objection, prior to the
actual annexation of property by an existing municipality. See notes 6, 11 supra.
l6Mahood v. State ex rel. Davis, 101 Fla. 1254, 133 So. 90 (1931). See Hall v.
State ex rel. Ervin, 46 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1950), for an exception to this rule. It is
submitted that the lack of reported cases stemming from this rule is due to the
fact that the facts that will support an attack based on the contiguity requirement
will also support an attack based on the susceptibility of municipal benefits
requirement; attorneys, for some reason, have proceeded under the latter.
l7The epitome of municipal expansion during the period occurred at Lake
Placid. In 1925 the legislature, by special act, transformed the community of
Lake Stearns, which had a population of between 400 and 500 people, with an
area of some 320 acres and a business district of about two blocks, into the City
of Lake Stearns, the municipal bounds of which covered approximately 28 square
miles. Not satisfied with its handiwork, the legislature, in 1927, abolished the
City of Lake Stearns and fashioned Lake Placid, covering an area of around 73
square miles. After this second attempt the legislature rested on its creative genius;
and well it might, for the municipal limits covered an area larger than that of

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

5

Florida Law Review,
Vol. 12, Iss.
3 [1959],
Art. 4
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW
REVIEW
many property owners throughout the state were suddenly awakened
to the fact that their property was in the corporate limits of some
municipality. Instead of sharing that proverbial pie in the sky they
were on the verge of losing their property for municipal taxes on the
auctioneer's block.
There had long been a statute on the books whereby landowners
who had property within the corporate limits of a municipality that
was "from distance or other cause . . . virtually or commensurately
excluded from the benefits of such municipal organization" could petition to have the land excluded, but it was applicable only to municipalities of less than 150 qualified electors.-i In 1929, in the landmark case of State ex rel. Davis v. City of Stuart' 9 the Florida Supreme Court came to the rescue of landowners who could not qualify
for relief under the statute by holding that the legislative power to
establish and extend municipal limits was not unlimited, for property
that was not susceptible to municipal benefits could not be included
within the corporate limits of a municipality. The holding was
based on the rationale that the legislature's power to extend the
corporate limits of a municipality was unquestioned and unlimited
as long as the extension did not violate any of the provisions of organic law, but that organic law, as embodied in sections 1 and 12 of
the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution, was violated
when property not susceptible to municipal benefits was taken into
a municipality.20 The benefits test was thus based on the protection
of the property rights of the individual.
The City of Stuart case gave rise to an overwhelming amount of
litigation as property owners over the state sought to exclude their
lands from municipalities. The benefit test was not well defined
in this case, and the Court found itself redefining and embellishing
it time and again as cases involving the benefits test and related
problems came before it on appeal.21 Justice Brown anticipated this
the District of Columbial See State ex rel. Davis v. Town of Lake Placid, 109
Fla. 419, 147 So. 468 (1933).
18FLA. STAT. §171.02 (1957).
1997 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335 (1929).
2oId. at 117, 120 So. at 352.
2ISee State ex rel. Watson v. City of Hallandale, 52 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1951): State
ex rel. Ervin v. City of Oakland Park, 42 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1949); Smith v. Town of
Montverde, 38 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1948); City of Winter Haven v. A. M. Klemm &
Son, 141 Fla. 75, 192 So. 646 (1939); State ex rel. Landis v. Town of Boca Raton,
129 Fla. 673, 177 So. 293 (1937); State ex rel. Landis v. Town of Lake Placid, 117
Fla. 874, 158 So. 497 (1935).
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to some degree when he noted that the "difficulty of judicial adjudication of such a class of cases, and the many and various factors
which enter into the determination of the constitutionality of such
legislation" should not deter the courts from protecting the individual's right under the provisions of organic law.22 The most recent
attempt by the Court to define the test was in 1952 in Gillete v. City
of Tampa,23 in which the Court summarized the existing rule as
follows:24

"'IT]here must be a present showing of population, industrialization or similar reason to authorize the bringing of large
areas of lands into a municipality,' . . . and... 'wild, unoccupied, unimproved lands so remote from a municipality that
they can receive no benefit therefrom' should not be included
therein . . . [but] it must be remembered that the Legislature
... must be held to have determined that the area in question
is amenable to municipal benefits ....
And while such a determination cannot be upheld if it constitutes 'a palpably
arbitrary, unnecessary, and flagrant invasion of personal and
property rights,'... the presumption is... that the extension
is reasonable and necessary and the burden is upon the objectors to convince the courts that the proceedings are illegal
or unreasonable and unnecessary."
The benefits test is available as a theory upon which relief can be
obtained by landowners whose property, although not susceptible to
municipal benefits, has been included within the corporate limits of
a municipality. Assuming that Grower is unable to avail himself of
the theory in objecting to the actual annexation of his property by
Sunshine City,25 he may utilize it in a proper action to seek relief
after the annexation. He may proceed in one of three ways: (1) petition under section 171.02 of Florida Statutes 1957 to exclude the
22State ex reL Davis v. City of Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 101, 120 So. 335, 346 (1929).
2357

So.2d 27 (Fla. 1952).

24d. at 29. The same test is applicable under FLA. STAT. §171.02 (1957) (pertaining to municipalities with less than 150 qualified electors). Compare State
ex rel. Watson v. Busbee, 43 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1949), with Smith v. Town of Mont-

verde, 38 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1948). The test is also applicable when the landowner
seeks to enjoin the municipality from taxing property within the corporate limits.
Klemm
v. City of Winter Haven, 114 So.2d 11 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
25See pp. 298-300 supra.
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property from the municipality, (2) quo warranto to oust the municipality from exercising jurisdiction over the land, and (3) injunction to enjoin the municipality from assessing and levying municipal taxes on the property.
Petition
Section 171.02 of Florida Statutes 1957 permits "any owners" of
lands within the corporate limits of a municipality that are "from
distance or other cause . . . virtually or commensurately excluded
from the benefits of such municipal organization" or "three-fourths"
of the owners of such lands to petition the circuit court to have the
lands excluded. The statute is applicable only to communities of less
than 150 qualified electors; thus Grower cannot seek relief by petition
unless Sunshine City has less than the specified number of electors.
Even though Grower may not be able to proceed under the statute,
it is nevertheless important; it permits an individual owner of property, in his own right, to petition for the exclusion of his property
from the municipality,26 and the statute is applicable whether the community was established by special act or under the general law.27 Once
lands are excluded by petition, they are "forever released from all
debts, duties, or liabilities" of the municipality.28
Quo Warranto
If a municipal corporation is exercising jurisdiction over property
that is not susceptible to municipal benefits, the proper remedy
against the wrongful exercise of power is a writ of quo warranto by
the attorney general.29 If Grower wants to prevent Sunshine City
from exercising jurisdiction over his property and he cannot proceed
2 Phillips v. Town of Altamonte Springs, 92 Fla. 862, 110 So. 460 (1926).
27Kirklands v. Town of Bradley, 104 Fla. 390, 139 So. 144 (1932); Phillips v.
Town of Altamonte Springs, supra note 26.
2SFLA. STAT. §171.03 (1957), Smith v. Amidon, 102 Fla. 492, 136 So. 256 (1931).

29See State ex rel. Davis v. City of Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335 (1929). For
quo warranto proceedings generally see Ervin and Rhodes, Quo Warranto in
Florida, 4 U. FLA. L. REv. 559 (1951). The extension of municipal boundaries
over property not susceptible to municipal benefits does not per se render the
annexation of such property invalid, and unless there has been an invasion of

individual property rights the benefits test cannot successfully be used by the
attorney general alone to oust the municipality from jurisdiction. See State ex rel.

Johnson v. City of Sarasota, 92 Fla. 563, 109 So. 473 (1926).
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under section 171.02, the proper procedure would be for him to
furnish the attorney general with the necessary information and request him to bring a writ of quo warranto against the municipality.
The attorney general has absolute discretion as to whether to institute
quo warranto proceedings, 30 but if he refuses to do so Grower is not
precluded from using this remedy. Upon the attorney general's refusal, Grower can, by statute, "institute proceedings upon writs of
quo warranto ... in the name of the state, to attack ... the validity
of the municipal corporation ...and the legal existence of its corporate franchises."'- In the quo warranto proceeding Grower will be
a corelator and any other landowners similarly affected by the annexation may join in the original proceeding as corelators or intervene
after the proceeding has been instituted.3 2 Grower will not be barred
from instituting the proceeding if the other landowners do not join
in, nor will the nonjoining landowners be barred from bringing a
similar action later. 33 Grower or any other corelator may be represented by his own counsel in the quo warranto proceeding.3 4
In quo warranto, Grower can seek the ouster of municipal jurisdiction over the entire area annexed by Sunshine City or a limited
ouster to exclude only his own property. -The Florida Supreme
Court has held that if petitioners who represent only a few of the
landowners within an annexed area seek the ouster of a municipality
by a writ of quo warranto and attack the entire annexation and it is
found that property not susceptible to municipal benefits has been
annexed, the annexation procedure should be invalidated and the
35
municipality ousted from the entire area annexed thereunder. However, in Town of Boynton v. State ex rel. Davis3 6 the corelator sought
only the ouster of his particular land, and the Court held that particular land could be excluded from the municipality's jurisdiction
without invalidating the entire annexation proceeding. The Court
3oState ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190 (1868).
3'FLA. STAT. §165.30 (1957).
3-State ex rel. Davis v. City of Clearwater, 106 Fla. 761, 139 So. 377 (1931);
see City of Auburndale v. State ex reL. Landis, 135 Fla. 172, 184 So. 787 (1938).
33 See State ex rel. Watson v. City of Hallandale, 52 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1951).
34FLA. STAT. §80.02 (1957).
35
. State ex rel. Davis v. City of Largo, 110 Fla. 21, 149 So. 420 (1933). The Court
indicated that this rule should be followed even if there was property within the
area susceptible to municipal benefits and some landowners wanted to remain in
the municipality. See also State ex rel. Davis v. City of Pompano, 113 Fla. 246,
151 So. 485 (1933).
36l03 Fla. 1113, 138 So. 639 (1932).
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cautioned that the holding did not mean "that the courts would go
so far ... as to exclude small vacant lots or parcels of land scattered
about within the interior of town . . . nor . . . chop out small indentations of rural or agricultural lands .... "37 The criterion as to

how small a parcel of land will be excluded is, at best, only relative,
for the court has approved the ouster of an eleven-acre tract of grove
property from a municipality with a corporate area of fourteen
square miles3 8 as well as a "chopping out" of property that separated
the municipality from other property lying beyond that affected by
the judgment. 39
If Grower is successful in obtaining a quo warranto judgment
of ouster against Sunshine City, the annexation procedure, whether
under general law or special act, is considered invalid ab initio.
Accordingly, the municipality cannot levy or collect regular municipal
taxes on the property. 40 A mere judgment of ouster will not necessarily relieve Grower of all tax liability, for the municipality can
tax the property to pay any bonded or other indebtedness incurred
by the city for public municipal improvements beneficial to the
property. 41 If, however, the municipal improvements resulting from
the indebtedness were not beneficial to the property at the time the
property was within the municipality, the city is without authority to
levy or collect any tax for the purpose of liquidating the in42
debtedness.
Injunction
Rather than proceed by petition or quo warranto to prevent the
city from exercising jurisdiction over his property, Grower may rely
37Id. at

1121, 138 So. at 642.
3sCity of Coral Gables v. State ex rel. Landis, 129 Fla. 834, 177 So. 290 (1937).
39City of Coral Gables v. State ex rel. Landis, 122 Fla. 17, 164 So. 535 (1935).
4oPierson v. Long, 103 Fla. 383, 137 So. 232 (1931).
41City of Sebring v. Harder Hall, Inc., 150 Fla. 824, 9 So.2d 350 (1942).
42Allen v. Town of Largo, 39 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1949); Certain Lands v. Town
of Lake Placid, 159 Fla, 180, 31 So.2d 249 (1947); Richmond v. Town of Largo, 155
Fla. 226, 19 So.2d 791 (1944). If the landowner delays a long time before obtaining
a quo warranto judgment of ouster, he may be estopped to prohibit taxation of
his property to pay any indebtedness incurred while his property was prima facie
within the municipality's jurisdiction even if the property was not benefited by
the improvements made as a result of the indebtedness. See Town of Howey in
the Hills v. Graessle, 57 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1952); Certain Lands v. Town of Lake
Placid, 49 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1950).
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on the benefits test and in his own right bring a bill to enjoin the
municipality from taxing his property. This method of relief was
firmly established in City of Sarasota v. Skillin43 though in a prior
44
case the Florida Supreme Court had stated:
"Where no adequate remedy is afforded landowners by proceedings at law, for excluding lands from illegal municipal
taxation, courts of equity may in proper cases ... relieve particular lands ... from unjust taxaton ... for purposes that
cannot in any way actually or potentially benefit the lands or
their owners, and the lands cannot be useful for any proper
municipal purposes."
The Court has apparently considered injunctive relief as an alternative method available to an individual contesting the validity of
the inclusion of his particular land within the municipality.45 If
the landowner's contentions are sustained, the municipality will not
be ousted from jurisdiction over the property, but will be enjoined
from levying and collecting municipal taxes; however, the court can
retain jurisdiction over the cause and modify the decree in the
event there is a change of circumstances and the property becomes
48
susceptible to municipal benefits.
Defenses Available to the Municipality
When Grower institutes proceedings based on the benefits test
for relief against the inclusion of his property within the corporate
limits, the municipality may rely on estoppel as a defense in addition
to the obvious defense that Grower's property is susceptible to municipal benefits. The Florida Supreme Court has permitted the use
43130 Fla. 724, 178 So. 837 (1937).
44State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. City of Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 663, 149 So. 409,
417 (1933).
45State ex rel. Watson v. City of Hallandale, 52 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1951). There
is no indication in the reported cases that before a landowner can avail himself
of injunctive relief he must have exhausted his other procedures for relief, petition
or quo warranto. See Town of Lake Hamilton v. Hughes, infra note 46; Town
of Eagle Lake v. Adams, 146 Fla. 165, 200 So. 367 (1941); City of Sarasota v.
Skillin, supra note 43; Klemm v. City of Winter Haven, 114 So.2d 11 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1959).
4sSee Town of Lake Hamilton v. Hughes, 159 Fla. 600, 32 So.2d 283 (1947).
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of estoppel, laches, and acquiescence, or combinations thereof4- by
municipalities to bar a landowner in cases of this nature, 48 but so

far the Court has failed to distinguish among the various situations
which give rise to estoppel or laches or acquiescence. 4 9 This oversight, if it may be called one, is probably intentional, for the Court
has observed that "an analysis of these cases seems to support the conclusion that estoppel . . . will be determined by the facts of each

case."50 A careful reading of "these cases" will probably lead one to
the conclusion that in this area "judgments ad hoc, with very little
assistance from precedent, are to be expected." 51
47City of Coral Gables v. State ex rel. Gibbs, 148 Fla. 671, 5 So,2d 241 (1941)
(estoppel by acquiescence); City of Auburndale v. State ex rel. Landis, 135 Fla.
172, 184 So. 787 (1938) (laches); State ex rel. Landis v. Town of Boynton Beach,
129 Fla. 528, 177 So. 327 (1937) (estoppel by laches); State ex rel. Landis v.
Haines City, 127 Fla. 239, 169 So. 383 (1936) (estoppel); State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v.
City of Ft. Lauderdale, 102 Fla. 1019, 136 So. 889 (1931) (acquiescence); State ex
rel. Davis v. City of Eau Gallie, 99 Fla. 579, 126 So. 124 (1930) (estoppel by
waiver). A giant, economy sized estoppel was permitted in Town of Lake Maitland
v. State ex rel. Landis, 127 Fla. 653, 173 So. 677 (1937) (estoppel by acquiescence
and laches).
4SThe defense of estoppel has generally been raised in quo warranto proceedings seeking to oust the municipality from jurisdiction over the landowner's property. There may be a question as to whether estoppel is available as a defense
when the landowner seeks to enjoin the municipality from levying and collecting
municipal taxes. Justice Adams in a concurring opinion in Town of Lake Hamilton v. Hughes, 154 Fla. 468, 469, 18 So.2d 23 (1944), stated that there was a
difference between the relief of ouster under quo warranto and injunctive relief
and that estoppel would be applicable as to the former but not the latter. But
see Town of Eagle Lake v. Adams, 146 Fla. 165, 200 So. 367 (1941); City of Sarasota v. Skillin, 130 Fla. 724, 178 So. 837 (1937) (estoppel raised as a defense but not
sustained). If the relief sought is an injunction against the collection of taxes by
the municipality to liquidate bonded or other indebtedness (incurred while the
landowner's property was within the corporate limits) after a prior judgment in a
quo warranto proceeding has ousted the municipality from jurisdiction, estoppel
can be utilized to bar the relief sought. Town of Howey in the Hills v. Graessle,
57 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1952); Certain Lands v. Town of Lake Placid, 49 So.2d 542
(Fla. 1950). But see Smith v. City of Winter Haven, 154 Fla. 439, 18 So.2d 4
(1944).
491n adjudicating cases involving the defense of estoppel, the Court has gone so
far as to state that the issue had been determined from the testimony by the
lower court and that "no useful purpose would be subserved in summarizing or
analyzing such testimony in this opinion." City of South Miami v. State ex rel.
Landis, 129 Fla. 125, 126, 176 So. 171, 172 (1937).
5oCity of South Miami v. State ex rel. Landis, 140 Fla. 740, 745, 192 So. 624,
627 (1939).
5
1lDauer and Miller, Municipal Charters in Florida: Law and Drafting, 6 U.
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In determining whether a landowner is barred from relief by estoppel, the courts apparently consider two important factors: the
length of the delay on the part of the landowner while he sits on
the "stool of do nothing" and the detriment to the municipality as
a result of any indebtedness incurred, improvements made, or benefits
rendered. 52 Some of the earlier opinions held that a long delay in
seeking relief was singularly adequate to constitute an estoppel sufficient to bar the landowner from relief, 53 but in State ex rel. Landis
v. Town of Boca Raton the Court stated:5 4
"This is undoubtedly a sound rule in those cases where the
question is close and honest men might differ as to the question
of benefits even though the benefit be remote and indirect.
This rule would also control in cases where delay had wrought
changes in such a way that to grant the prayer of the writ
would be inequitable .... "
However, the Court went on to hold that delay alone will not generally bar the landowner; the delay "must operate to the detriment
of some one who is a party to the cause." 55 A consideration of the
periods of delay by the landowner and the various "detriments" that
the Court has deemed sufficient to raise an estoppel would add little,56
for in the final analysis the reported decisions represent little more
than a judicial balancing of the equities between the landowner and
the municipality. If Grower delays in bringing an action for relief
against Sunshine City for the inclusion of his property within the

FLA.

L. REV. 413, 454 (1953).

52State ex rel. Davis v. City of Clearwater, 106 Fla. 761, 139 So. 377 (1931).
The delay of a predecessor in title to property will be imputed to the landowner
seeking relief. See State ex rel. Landis v. City of Coral Gables, 120 Fla. 492, 163
So. 308 (1935).
23E.g., State ex rel. Landis v. Haines City, 127 Fla. 239, 169 So. 383 (1936);
State ex rel. Davis v. City of Eau Gallie, 99 Fla. 579, 126 So. 124 (1930).
54129 Fla. 673, 674, 177 So. 293 (1937).
(Emphasis supplied.)
55Ibid. See also City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Wood, 56 So.2d 520 (Fla.
1952); City of Coral Gables v. State ex rel. Gibbs, 148 Fla. 671, 5 So.2d 241 (1941).
The Court has indicated in at least one case that it is reasonable for the landowner to delay in seeking relief in order to see if municipal benefits are forthcoming after the inclusion of his property within the municipality. City of
South Miami v. State ex rel. Landis, 140 Fla. 740, 192 So. 624 (1939).
56
See cases cited note 47 supra.
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corporate limits and the municipality pleads estoppel, one can only
wish Grower well.
Factors OperatingAgainst Landowner's
Successfully Invoking the Benefits Test
In addition to the possibility of the court's balancing the equities
by finding estoppel, thereby barring the landowner from relief, there
are several other factors which work against the landowner's successfully invoking the benefits test. These combine to make the position
of any landowner treacherous when contesting the validity of the
exercise of municipal jurisdiction over his property and to weaken
the benefits test to such a degree that a landowner in Grower's position is virtually precluded from using it.
Burden of Proof. In any action for relief under the benefits test
the landowner has the burden of proof. This is as it should be, but
the quantum of proof that must be produced thereunder makes the
burden of proof difficult. There is, of course, a presumption that the
annexation is valid; and the Florida Supreme Court, in establishing
the benefits test, cautioned that it can be invoked only when the annexation constitutes "a palpably arbitrary, unnecessary, and flagrant
invasion of personal and property rights, ' ' 57 but stated that this
should not deter the courts from protecting those rights "in those
cases, rare though they may be, where . . . [they are] clearly and
s
beyond all reasonable doubt, violated and disregarded."58
When
these statements are compared with those as to the application of
estoppel "in those cases where the question is close and honest men
might differ as to the question of benefits," 9 it is fairly obvious that
the burden of proof on the landowner is no light one.

Nature of the Land Versus the Nature of the Area in Which It
Is Located. The earlier cases involving the benefits theory would
lead one to the conclusion that when an individual is contesting the
inclusion of his property within a municipality, the nature of the
57State ex rel. Davis v. City of Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 101, 120 So. 335, 346 (1929).
(Emphasis supplied.)
58id. at 101, 120 So. at 347. (Emphasis supplied.) See also State ex rel. Landis
v. Town of Boynton Beach, 129 Fla. 528, 177 So. 327 (1937); State ex rel. Att'y
Gen. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 102 Fla. 1019, 136 So. 889 (1931).
59
See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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particular land and its utilization are the important factors in determining its susceptibility to municipal benefits. The cases discussed these factors and referred to the application of the benefits test
to property used for "groves, farms, or gardens" or which is "wild,
unimproved, or vacant land." 60 Gradually there was a change in
emphasis, and the Court began to indicate that annexation would be
valid if there was a showing of a community of people and of industrialization within the area annexed. 61 In a situation like Grower's,
the nature of his particular land and its utilization are of little concern; the important factor is the area in which it is located and the
area's location in reference to the municipality. 2 The crux of the
matter has been most ably stated by Justice Barnes in a concurring
opinion in State ex rel. Ervin v. City of Oakland Park:63
"Municipal corporations are created to serve the people and
the land to be included is such land as has by use been dedicated to urban, as distinguished from rural, life. If the land
by use has not been dedicated to urban life by use it must
bear such a relationship to the community as by the nature
of things makes it a part of the community."
Individual Versus Community. In the final analysis, if Grower
contests the inclusion of his property within the corporate limits
of Sunshine City, it will be, in essence, a conflict between the individual and the community. When the benefits test was originally
6oE.g., State ex rel. Davis v. City of Largo, 110 Fla. 21, 149 So. 420 (1933); State
ex rel. Davis v. City of Stuart, supra note 57.
61State ex rel. Ervin v. City of Oakland Park, 42 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1949). See also
State ex rel. Landis v. Town of Lake Placid, 117 Fla. 874, 158 So. 497 (1933);
State ex Tel. Davis v. Town of Lake Placid, 109 Fla. 419, 147 So. 468 (1933). The
phrase groves, farms, or gardens has virtually disappeared from the opinions in
the more recent cases. E.g., Gillete v. City of Tampa, 57 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1952)
(portion of land used for a dairy and part was swamp); Klemm v. City of Winter
Haven, 114 So.2d 11 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959) (194 acres of grove property).
62Remoteness of the property from the municipality is of primary importance
in determining if it is susceptible to municipal benefits. Note the wording of
FI A. STAT. §171.02 (1957): "from distance or other cause . . . virtually excluded
. . . from the benefits ...... In City of Coral Gables v. State ex tel. Gibbs, 148
Fla. 671, 676, 5 So.2d 241, 243 (1941), the Court stated that exclusion turned on
the determination of "whether the property was so distant from the center of the
city that unavailability of benefits warranted exclusion .... ." See also City of
Coral Gables v. State ex rel. Landis, 122 Fla. 17, 164 So. 535 (1935).
6342 So.2d 270, 272 (Fla. 1949).
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developed it was based on the rationale that there could be a valid
annexation of property as long as the personal and property rights of
the individual were not violated. 64 The emphasis was on the individual and his protection. Perhaps it is but a testimonial to the currently prevailing philosophy of togetherness and the organized man,
but in cases of this nature the emphasis is no longer on the rights of
the individual but on community expediency. This shift was aptly
chronicled in Gillete v. City of Tampa, when the Florida Supreme
Court approvingly quoted from a Virginia case:65
" '[I]t is no answer to an annexation proceeding to assert that
individual residents ...

do not need or desire the governmental

services rendered by the city. A county resident may be willing
to take a chance on police, fire and health protection, and
even tolerate the inadequacy of sewerage, water and garbage
service. As long as he lives in an isolated situation his desire for
lesser services and cheaper government may be acquiesced in
with complacency, but when the movement of population
has made him a part of a compact urban community, his individual preferences can no longer be permitted to prevail. It
is not so much that he needs the city government, as it is that
the area in which he lives needs it.'"
The controversy between Grower and Sunshine City must eventually
be resolved, and at present there can be little doubt that the community has an advantageous position. In addition, it will be the
court of original jurisdiction - the court closest to the community
and aware of the community sentiment - that will determine the
controversy; it will be that court which will balance the equities be66
tween Grower and Sunshine City.

64See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
6557 So.2d 27, 29
(Fla. 1952). The same quotation was reiterated by the
Second District Court of Appeal in Klemm v. City of Winter Haven, 114 So.2d
11, 12 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959) (bill by property owner to enjoin the municipality
from levying and collecting municipal taxes on 194 acres of orange grove denied).
66It is rare in cases of this nature for an appellate court to reverse a lower
court. In addition to the presumption of the correctness of the ruling of the
lower court, the appellate courts have assumed that in these cases the lower court
is in the better position to determine the controversy. In City of Coral Gables
v. State ex rel. Landis, 129 Fla. 834, 840, 177 So. 290, 292 (1937), the Court observed that the "court below was acquainted with the lands described in the
information, its location within the incorporate limits . . . . the lack of municipal
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CONCLUSION

There is very little that Grower can do to prevent the annexation
of his property by Sunshine City, and his chances of ousting the
municipality from exercising municipal jurisdiction over the property or of enjoining it from taxing the property under the benefits
test are rather remote. The inclusion of Grower's property within
the municipality is probably of little concern to him except for one
thing -municipal taxes, which threaten his continued existence as an
agrarian. 67 Under Florida's current philosophy of industrialization,
populization, and progress (whatever that means) Grower is not
going to fare well when the equities are balanced. Sunshine City
views Grower with disdain because he threatens its progress and
prosperity; Grower represents a thorn in the side of the Sunshine
City Chamber of Commerce. But what about Grower? There was
a time, in the not too distant past, when the community needed him.
The Chamber of Commerce does not remember when the municipality
was a struggling community of 450 inhabitants and Grower's 200
acres of citrus grove was a very vital contribution to the municipality's
over-all economy. The Chamber recognizes only Grower's present
contribution, which is relatively minute; the municipality no longer
needs him and is ready to discard him like the proverbial old shoe.
But does Grower not merit some consideration?
It is submitted that the true agrarians who are caught in Grower's
benefits, the purpose for which the land was used, and . . . entered its judgment
of ouster."
oTFla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-226, provides that property used for agricultural purposes can be assessed on the basis of actual use value; this could decrease the
assessments on agricultural lands. Before property can be assessed on this basis,
however, it must be zoned as agricultural land, and the zoning is at the discretion
of the board of county commissioners.
It is far too early to determine the operation (or even the validity) of this
act; but it is submitted that it is not applicable to municipal taxation, for counties and municipalities in Florida are treated as separate and distinct taxing units,
and FLA. CONSr. art. IX, §5, requires municipalities to make their own assessments.
Nevertheless, this act, if made operative by a board of county commissioners, might
relieve a little of the tax pressure forced on the agrarian when his property is
annexed by a municipality. First, a lower county assessment might reduce the ad
valorem county taxes to such an extent that when the agrarian's property is annexed the addition of municipal taxes will put him in no worse a position economically than he was prior to the reduction of county and the addition of
municipal taxes. Second, as a practical matter, the municipal tax assessor might
be guided by the county assessment in making his assessment.
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situation do merit consideration;6s accordingly it is recommended that
the Florida Constitution be amended so as to exempt the bona fide
agrarian from municipal taxation when his property is annexed by
a municipality.69 Such an exemption, however, should require that
the property shall be used exclusively for agricultural purposes for a
minimum number of years and shall provide the primary means of
the agrarian's support. This exemption would work to the detriment
of the municipalities, for they could no longer use the power of
taxation to force agrarians to abandon agricultural property located
within the municipality; but the amendment could provide that
when the agrarian sells the property or devotes it to a nonagricultural
use he can be back-taxed for a maximum number of years. Such an
exemption and back-taxing provision would tend to balance the
equities between the municipality and the agrarian and would largely
differentiate between the land speculator posing as an agrarian and
the bona fide agrarian.
This recommendation, of course, is not in accord with the principles of zoning, city planning, and that elusive concept "progress."
But perhaps there are some who fail to define progress in terms of
population, capital output, and product consumption. Perhaps there
are a few people left who are repelled by road signs which read
"Homesites: $10 down" and by the sight of low-income housing developments- the slums of tomorrow. The proponents of presentday progress have outdone their counterparts of yesterday; instead of
"a car in every garage and a chicken in every pot" it is "a TV in every
split-level house and a barbecue pit in every back yard." Perhaps
the TV-barbeque pit ideal is progress, but it is a strange type of
progress that advances at the expense of an individual like Grower,
whose only fault is that he contributed to the progress of yesterday.
JAMES

E.

GLASS

6sWith the passage of Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-226, the legislature has apparently
considered that the agrarian does merit some consideration in regard to the problem of rising taxes, which threatens his existence.
69A statute exempting the property would probably be invalid in light of the
fact that FLA. CONsT. art. IX, §5, requires that municipalities tax on the principles of state taxation, and under art. IX, §1, this would require a uniform and
equal rate of taxation on all property within the municipality. Furthermore,
"agricultural purposes" is not one of the exemptions provided for in art. IX, §1.
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